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Religious pluralism is one of the most vibrant topics within current philosophy of 
religion. This is in part due to the increasingly multi-, or poly-, cultural environment 
within which philosophy of religion is now practised and taught. More importantly 
though, it is because thinking about theories of religious pluralism requires that one 
engage with some of the deepest and most interesting questions lying at the heart of 
philosophy in general—questions about philosophical methodology, the nature of 
truth, logic, and language. While this chapter examines one highly influential form of 
religious pluralism and reviews some criticisms of that form, it seeks to go beyond a 
surface level discussion of the pros and cons of any particular pluralist theory in order 
to show where the deeper philosophical issues lie. I begin with some terminological 
considerations which will clarify further the focus of this chapter. 
 
The Relationship between Pluralism and Diversity 
 
‘Pluralism’ is a concept whose meaning is highly context-sensitive. It is used in a 
startling variety of ways both within popular discourse and within different academic 
disciplines (Hare and Harrison, forthcoming). Underlying this variety two basic 
understandings of the relationship between diversity and pluralism can be discerned. 
According to one understanding of this relationship, pluralism is simply a positive 
attitude towards diversity and a pluralist is one who adopts such an attitude. This 
stance, which I shall call ‘attitudinal pluralism,’ although it might also aptly be termed 
‘affective pluralism,’ captures the common-sense view that a pluralist is someone who 
tolerates diversity; however, taken on its own, it does not do justice to the richness of 
meanings conveyed by the word ‘pluralism’ in ordinary discourse or to the way in 
which the term is currently used within philosophy of religion. According to the other 
understanding of the relationship between diversity and pluralism, pluralism is a 
higher-level theoretical response to diversity. Here I shall call this type of stance 
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‘methodological pluralism.’ Methodological pluralism is the chief concern of this 
chapter. 
Both attitudinal and methodological pluralism are responses to diversity, the 
former is primarily an emotional response whereas the latter is a theoretical response. 
That diversity elicits such responses alerts us to the fact that in certain domains, 
especially, but by no means exclusively, the religious and the ethical, protracted 
failure to reach agreement about core issues on the part of those whom we might 
reasonably consider to be epistemic peers is often regarded as problematic and as 
requiring some explanation. 
 
Disagreement 
 
A key philosophical puzzle raised by religious diversity arises from protracted and 
seemingly intractable disagreement on the part of those subscribing to different 
religious belief systems. Adherents of different religions disagree about key issues, 
such as whether or not there is a God, whether or not the universe had a beginning, 
and whether or not humans have immortal souls. There are also major disagreements 
within religious traditions concerning, for example, the nature of God and our own 
post-mortem destiny.  
Why are such disagreements among and within religious traditions thought to 
be so problematic? At the most basic level, if one person holds X and another holds 
not-X, it might seem to be a simple consequence of logic that at most only one of 
them can be correct. Likewise, if we extend this consideration to belief systems as a 
whole, it might appear that if two belief systems disagree on some issue (the 
immortality of the soul, for example), at most one of them can be correct. As Bertrand 
Russell observed, ‘[i]t is evident as a matter of logic that, since [the great religions of 
the world] disagree, not more than one of them can be true’ (Russell 1957, xi). This 
spectre of logical contradiction is often seen as the core of the philosophical problem 
generated by the existence of a diversity of religious belief systems holding mutually 
inconsistent beliefs. It would seem that, under pain of logical contradiction, at most 
one religious belief system can be correct. However, given the state of the available 
evidence, many hold that disagreement about which of these belief systems, if any, is 
in fact the correct one is irresolvable by rational means. As we shall see, it is this 
problem of apparently rational disagreement in matters of religious belief that 
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methodological pluralism seeks to address. Clearly, adequately addressing this 
problem requires more than adopting pluralism in the form of a positive attitude 
towards diversity. 
The tenacious character of religious disagreements is sometimes taken to 
imply that there are no facts of the matter with reference to which these disagreements 
could be settled; religious belief is non-cognitive for it is not concerned with 
objectively accessible religious facts, as there are none. One taking this view may 
claim that religious utterances can be reinterpreted into, for example, statements about 
human psychology, emotions, or values. Lack of convergence in religious beliefs over 
time can be taken as evidence for such a judgement; although it need not be taken this 
way. Alternatively, in the face of protracted disagreement, one might hold the 
pluralist view that different religious conceptual schemata seek to make objectively 
true claims and do so more or less equally well, while explaining disagreement as a 
result of the difficulty of accessing the relevant facts. Such disagreement might be 
described as ‘faultless’ insofar as it has arisen due to the elusive nature of religious 
facts—the purported objects of religious beliefs—and, as such, it does not necessarily 
entail that any of the religious conceptual schemata are inadequate to these facts. 
In a world in which people subscribing to different religious belief systems 
often live side-by-side, it would seem desirable to have a theory which did not entail 
either that all religious adherents are mistaken in their beliefs (as a non-cognitivist or 
a naturalist might hold) or that at most one of the religious belief systems could be 
substantially correct (as an exclusivist would hold). Methodological pluralism 
attempts to provide just such a theory, and in doing so it seeks to avoid a significant 
problem faced by attitudinal pluralism. An attitudinal pluralist, when confronted with 
a diversity of different belief systems each supporting apparently contradictory 
propositions, must adopt a positive attitude towards all of them while at the same time, 
if she is rational, holding that at best only one of the conflicting sets of belief can be 
true. In short the attitudinal pluralist may be accused of not taking the beliefs of others 
seriously by adopting a positive attitude towards all of them while assuming that most 
of them are in fact false. This is akin to the difficulty faced by those who argue for 
religious toleration when they are confronted with the objection that one only needs to 
tolerate that which one does not approve (see Schmidt-Leukel 2002 and Griffiths 
2001, 101–11). 
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 Methodological pluralism allows, but does not require, pluralists to maintain a 
positive attitude towards diverse belief systems (it is thus compatible with attitudinal 
pluralism) while holding that each system might be substantially correct even in cases 
where different belief systems appear to hold conflicting beliefs about the same issues.  
 
Pluralism within Philosophy of Religion 
 
Philosophers of religion often take religious pluralism to be the view that the core 
claims of more than one religious tradition can be true, or at least justifiably believed, 
even though different religious traditions assert the truth of diverse, and sometimes 
even contradictory, claims. Theories of religious pluralism are typically proposed as 
alternatives to so-called exclusivist theories (on which see, for example, Plantinga 
1995 and 2000) which hold that the core claims of at most one religion can be true 
and that the claims made within other traditions are false insofar as they conflict with 
the true claims of the preferred religion.  
Within contemporary Anglophone philosophy of religion interest in theories 
of religious pluralism has been fuelled by the increasingly felt need to broaden the 
scope of the discipline to include ideas from a wider range of religious traditions than 
was usually the case in the past (see Schellenberg 2008 and 2005). As we shall see 
below, desire to expand the scope of the discipline in this way gives rise to 
methodological issues which require philosophers of religion to grapple not only with 
religious but also with philosophical diversity.  
One approach to expanding the scope of the discipline is exemplified in Keith 
Yandell’s Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction (Yandell 1999). 
Yandell’s strategy in this book is first to provide an abstract and schematic account of 
four religious perspectives: that of Jainism, Theravada Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta 
Hinduism, and, what he terms, Generic Philosophical Monotheism. Yandell then 
extracts from these perspectives a number of fundamental ontological commitments, 
which are used to yield the following claims: 
 
If Generic Philosophical Monotheism is correct, God and persons created by 
God must exist. 
If Jainism is correct, persons that don’t depend for their existence on anything 
must exist. 
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If Theravada Buddhism is correct, only transitory states exist. 
If Advaita Vedanta Hinduism is correct,1 only qualityless Brahman exists. 
(Paraphrased from Yandell 1999, 34) 
 
 The next step in Yandell’s argument is to demonstrate that if any one of these 
claims is true, then that would entail the falsity of all the other claims. The project of 
the rest of Yandell’s book is, then, to analyse the relevant claims in detail with a view 
to establishing if any one of them can be justifiably held to be true, or, conversely, if 
any of them can be ruled out as false (or, ideally, as necessarily false on the grounds 
that the claim itself entails a logical contradiction—which, in Yandell’s assessment, is 
the fate of the core ontological claim of Advaita Vedanta).2 
The success of Yandell’s project, and others like it, requires that at least two 
conditions are met. First, that the relevant claims can be formulated precisely and 
accurately enough to generate logical contradictions. Second, that no theory of 
religious pluralism can provide a coherent account of the truth of religious claims that 
would block the generation of the required contradictions. For example, a pluralist 
theory according to which it might be possible rationally to hold both that ‘persons 
depend on God for their existence’ and that ‘persons are ontologically independent’ 
would prevent Yandell’s project from proceeding further. Hence, a key set of sub-
arguments in Yandell’s book concern the refutation of religious pluralism. Yandell 
seeks to demonstrate that religious pluralism—at least in the form which he 
considers—is not even possibly true because it entails a logical contradiction (see 
Yandell 1999, 67–79). 
Later I consider some criticisms of religious pluralism advanced by Yandell 
and others. Before doing so, however, it is worth briefly considering whether the 
coherence and rational acceptability of some theory of religious pluralism would 
necessarily put a stop to multi-traditional philosophy of religion, as Yandell thinks 
that it would. Certainly, projects such as Yandell’s would not fare well if some form 
of religious pluralism were widely accepted. But might there not be another direction 
                                                 
1  More exactly, what would be correct in each of these cases are the diagnoses of the human condition 
and the proposed cures of it proffered by each of the traditions. See Yandell 1999, 33. 
2 ‘Thus to claim that Brahman, or anything else, is qualityless is to claim that it exists and to deny an 
entailment of that very claim. Hence Advaita Vedanta metaphysics is not even possible true.’ Yandell 
1999, 242. 
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that philosophy of religion could take if it were responsive to some form of 
methodological religious pluralism? I return to this question below.  
Religious pluralism, in the methodological sense explained above, has played 
an increasingly prominent role in analytic philosophy of religion since the 1980s. 
Discussion of it has, however, tended to remain narrowly focused on just one form of 
pluralist theory, namely, on that form that has been proposed and developed by John 
Hick (1922–2012). Despite the fact that alternative forms of methodological religious 
pluralism have been advanced by a number of thinkers including Joseph Runzo 
(1986), Robert Cummings Neville (1991), Stephen Kaplan (1992), Kenneth Rose 
(1996), and Victoria Harrison (2006), many seem tacitly to assume that there is just 
one theory of religious pluralism; and the debate then concerns whether or not this 
theory is to be accepted. While the time seems long overdue for more sustained 
consideration of alternative theories—a point to which I return later—it is undeniable 
that Hick’s is the most well-known and influential pluralist theory within philosophy 
of religion to date. Hence, any overview of religious pluralism must engage in some 
detail with Hick’s theory and its critics. 
 
Hickean Transcendental Pluralism 
 
The fullest exposition of John Hick’s form of pluralism is found in his An 
Interpretation of Religion (first published in 1989, second edition 2004). I will explain 
the argument of this book in some detail because, as mentioned above, much of the 
more recent work within philosophy of religion on the topic of pluralism is a response 
to Hick’s seminal contribution in this book, and virtually all of the current discussion 
about the topic still takes place within the conceptual framework articulated by Hick.3 
 Before introducing his version of religious pluralism Hick provides a context 
for it by explaining, what he characterises as, his ‘religious interpretation of religion’ 
(Hick 2004, 1). Hick sought to develop a religious interpretation of religion that 
would stand as a plausible rival to the various naturalistic theories of religion that 
seemed to be gaining ascendancy during the second half of the twentieth century. 
After recounting a wealth of phenomenological data about the world’s major religious 
traditions, he proceeds to a defence of one of his key claims: that the universe is 
                                                 
3 For a study of the development of Hick’s pluralist view, see Eddy 2002. 
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religiously ambiguous in the sense that it permits both religious and naturalistic 
interpretations, and that these interpretations are both consistent with different ways 
of experiencing the world (see McKim 2001). As he explains, this does ‘not mean that 
it [the universe] has no definite character but that it is capable from our present human 
vantage point of being thought and experienced in both religious and naturalistic 
ways’ (Hick 2004, 73). To establish this claim Hick reviews the main arguments in 
favour of a religious interpretation and while he concedes that none is decisive he also 
judges naturalism’s claim that theism is redundant to be unpersuasive, especially on 
the grounds that there are so many features of our religious, ethical and aesthetic 
experience that seem to invite a response framed in terms of a religious interpretation. 
 The ambiguity of the universe, Hick argues, presents each one of us with a 
‘fundamental option’—whether to experience it in a religious or a non-religious way. 
The choice that we must make, according to Hick, does not concern whether to 
believe in a proposition (‘that God exists’ for instance), but instead takes place at the 
level of what we might call cognitive orientation (see Hick 2004, 159). What is at 
stake in such a choice is whether or not we will experience the world religiously or 
naturalistically. Moreover, because the choice is underdetermined by the actual and 
possible evidence, Hick avers that both religious people and naturalists can be rational 
in basing their beliefs about the nature of the world on their own way of experiencing 
it (Hick 2004, 233). (Underlying this argument is what has been termed the Principle 
of Critical Trust, see Kwan 2003 and 2012.)  
 The argument so far explained has addressed the disagreement between 
naturalists and those holding a religious perspective. With the conclusion of that 
argument in place, Hick then argues that there is a further level of ambiguity to take 
into account if we are to reach a fuller understanding of our cognitive position. This 
next level of ambiguity faces one who opts against a naturalistic interpretation of the 
universe and chooses to experience and interpret it in a religious way. To such an 
individual a series of further options present themselves in the form of different 
religious traditions, each offering distinctive interpretations of the universe and 
different possibilities of experiencing religiously within it. Moreover, in Hick’s 
assessment, the evidence and arguments in favour of any one of these traditions over 
the others do not appear decisive. Religious experience seems to be capable of 
supporting each of the various religious options to a roughly similar degree, as does 
the evidence provided by other factors such as the number and quality of the saints a 
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given tradition produces (see Hick 1991). The universe is then ambiguous in the sense 
that it can rationally support a number of quite different religious interpretations and 
ways of experiencing religiously.  
Hick then deploys the observation that different religions make strikingly 
different and often contradictory claims about a wide range of gods, goddesses, and 
non-personal ultimates to introduce his pluralist hypothesis. At the heart of this 
hypothesis is his conviction that ‘the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways 
of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which 
transcends all our varied visions of it’ (Hick 2004, 235–36). Hick terms this 
postulated ultimate divine Reality ‘the Real’ and claims that it is this which is the 
‘ground’ of all authentic religious phenomena and religious experience (Hick 2004, 
236). 
Thus Hick attempts to address the philosophical problems raised by the fact 
that religions have proposed for belief a very large number of different deities and 
have subscribed to irreconcilably different conceptions of ultimate reality, with the 
claim that behind this variety lies something even more ultimate, namely, the Real. 
This brings us to this nub of Hick’s pluralist hypothesis, which is that 
 
the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and 
correspondingly different responses to, the Real from within the major variant 
ways of being human; and that within each of them the transformation of 
human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place. 
(Hick 2004, 240). 
 
Hick explains that these ‘different perceptions and conceptions’ of the Real concern 
the Real as it is thinkable and experiencable by beings such as ourselves. In other 
words, they concern the gods, goddesses and various ultimates of the religious 
traditions of the world. But, as we have seen, Hick postulates a further reality behind 
these phenomena; to distinguish this more fundamental reality from the various 
perceptions and conceptions of it, he calls it ‘the Real an sich’ (the Real in itself). The 
Real in itself, in Hick’s assessment, lies permanently beyond the range of our thought 
and experience (Hick presents it as a ‘postulate’ in a broadly Kantian sense). While 
each of the major post-axial religious traditions provides a way of conceiving and 
experiencing the Real, none is able to deliver a conception or experience of the Real 
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an sich because it is impossible for finite and limited beings such as ourselves to 
experience or conceive the infinite and unlimited Real an sich. The conclusion Hick 
draws is that, as far as we can tell, each major religion is appropriately related to the 
Real an sich and is therefore capable of facilitating a salvific transformation on the 
part of its adherents. 
 Hick’s distinction between the Real as it is in itself (the Real an sich) and the 
Real as it is thought of and experienced by us, as he readily acknowledges, is indebted 
to Kant’s distinction between a noumenon (a thing as it is in itself) and a phenomenon 
(a thing as it appears to human consciousness) (see Hick 2004, 240–46). The most 
important idea that Hick takes from Kant is that ‘the noumenal world exists 
independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal world is that same world as 
it appears to our human consciousness’ (Hick 2004, 241). Hick deploys this idea 
within the context of religious epistemology (something which Kant did not venture 
to do), and it is this which enables him to formulate his key claim: 
 
 [T]he noumenal Real is experienced and thought by different human 
mentalities, forming and formed by different religious traditions, as the range 
of gods and absolutes which the phenomenology of religion reports. And these 
divine personae and metaphysical impersonae…are not illusory but are 
empirically, that is experientially, real as authentic manifestations of the Real. 
(Hick 2004, 242) 
 
Addressing the question of the relation of human experience to the Real, Hick 
continues: 
 
 [T]he Real is experienced by human beings, but experienced in a manner 
analogous to that in which, according to Kant, we experience the world: 
namely by informational input from external reality being interpreted in the 
mind in terms of its own categorical scheme and thus coming to consciousness 
as meaningful phenomenal experience. All that we are entitled to say about the 
noumenal source of this information is that it is the reality whose influence 
produces, in collaboration with the human mind, the phenomenal world of our 
experience. This takes place through certain concepts which Kant calls the 
categories of the understanding. (Hick 2004, 243) 
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 Certain basic categories, then, as Hick proceeds to argue, have a vital role in 
the process of bringing either the world or the Real to consciousness. Hick proposes 
that in the latter case there are two such basic categories: first, the concept of the Real 
as a personal God, and second, that of the Real as a non-personal Absolute (see Hick 
2004, 245). While neither of these two basic categories allows the Real to be thought 
of or experienced in itself, according to Hick, both nonetheless generate a multiplicity 
of ways of authentically experiencing and conceiving of the Real. Moreover, he 
claims that, ‘[e]ach of these two basic categories, God and the Absolute, is 
schematised or made concrete within actual religious experience as a range of 
particular gods or absolutes’ (Hick 2004, 245). The particular forms these gods and 
absolutes take are shaped by the various local contexts provided by the diverse human 
cultures that have flourished in different times and places. It follows, argues Hick, that 
all talk about gods and other religious phenomena refers to the Real as phenomenal, 
in other words, to the Real as it is—or could be—thought of and experienced by us. 
About the Real as it is in itself we can say nothing concrete; although we can, Hick 
avers, make purely formal statements about it (Hick suggests that Anselm’s 
formulation ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ applies to the Real in 
itself as it is a purely formal concept which does not entail any concrete 
characteristics (Hick 2004, 246)). 
 According to Hick, we cannot literally ascribe any characteristics or attributes, 
such as compassion or love, to the Real an sich; although we can do so with respect to 
the Real as it is thought of and experienced by us as the various religious phenomena 
of the world. For instance, we could literally assert that the God of Abraham was a 
just God but we could not literally assert this of the Real in itself. It follows that if we 
are to say anything about the Real an sich, we must do so by deploying language 
mythologically. Mythical statements are principally evocative, in Hick’s view. A 
myth succeeds if it ‘evokes an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject-matter’ 
(Hick 2004, 248). A true myth, in Hick’s understanding, is not a literally true 
statement but nonetheless ‘rightly relates us to a reality about which we cannot speak 
in non-mythological terms’ and evokes ‘in us attitudes and modes of behaviour which 
are appropriate to our situation in relation to the Real’ (Hick 2004, 248). Hick further 
explains: 
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According to the pluralistic hypothesis we can make true and false literal and 
analogical statements about our own image of the Ultimate, truth or falsity 
here being determined internally by the norms of our tradition. But statements 
about the Real in itself have mythological, not literal, value. A statement about 
X is mythologically true if it is not literally true but nevertheless tends to 
evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to X. Mythological truth is thus a 
kind of practical or pragmatic as distinguished from theoretical truth. (Hick 
2004, xxxiv) 
 
Hick employs this distinction between practical and theoretical truth to support his 
claim that certain statements can be literally true of images of the divine (what he 
calls the divine personae and metaphysical impersonae of the Real), while being non-
literally but mythologically true of the Real in itself. According to Hick, the fact that 
religions hold different beliefs does not entail, as it does for an exclusivist, that at 
most only one of them can be substantially correct. This is because, at the literal level 
different religions describe different phenomena and hence do not contradict one 
another, and at the mythological level there is no contradiction for, not being literally 
true or false, myths are just not the sort of things that can be in contradiction. 
 The notion of the Real an sich is clearly of pivotal importance to Hickean 
pluralism. Not surprisingly, criticism of Hick’s theory has tended to target precisely 
this notion, as we shall now see. 
 
Key Criticisms of Hickean Pluralism 
 
Critics have focused on Hick’s claim that our statements cannot refer to the Real an 
sich literally and on his view that any language which we employ to talk about the 
Real an sich can only be metaphorically true if it is true at all (for instance, Byrne 
1982 and Netland 1991). As we have seen, Hick endorses what we might call a strong 
ineffability claim; holding the Real an sich to be in principle beyond description in 
either positive or negative terms. Some of Hick’s critics (for example, Rowe 1999, 
Yandell 1999 and Plantinga 2000) have argued that in cases in which mutually 
contradictory qualities are at stake, such as X and not-X, if we deny that the Real an 
sich possesses X we are logically committed to asserting that ‘not-X’ applies to it 
literally. Plantinga illustrates this criticism with the following example: 
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 If Hick means that none of our terms applies literally to the Real, then it isn’t 
possible to make sense of what he says. I take it that the term ‘tricycle’ does 
not apply to the Real; the Real is not a tricycle. But if the Real is not a tricycle, 
then, ‘is not a tricycle’ applies literally to it; it is a nontricycle. It could hardly 
be neither a tricycle nor a nontricycle, nor do I think that Hick would want to 
suggest that it could. (Plantinga 2000, 45) 
 
Hick’s response to such critics is to assert that he does indeed wish to deny 
that concepts such as tricycle either apply or fail to apply to the Real, this is a simple 
consequence of his claim that no statements apply literally to the Real an sich. He 
claims that the Real an sich is beyond such concepts because it is just not the kind of 
thing to which such concepts could either apply or fail to apply. Is a molecule stupid 
or clever, or a stone virtuous or wicked, asks Hick rhetorically. The molecule is surely 
not stupid, but by failing to be stupid it is not thereby clever, likewise, a lack of virtue 
does not require that we call a stone wicked. And so it is with the Real an sich; certain 
concepts, indeed, most concepts, do not apply (see Hick 2004, xix–xxii). 
 Yet Hick does concede that while ‘substantial’ attributions—that is, those that 
would give us descriptive information—do not apply literally to the Real an sich, 
purely ‘formal’ attributions are permissible. One might say of the Real an sich, then, 
that it is ‘able to be referred to’ or that it is ‘that than which nothing greater can be 
thought’. However, it is vital to Hick’s theory that no such formal attributions provide 
any descriptive content. If Hick were to allow any descriptive content to attributions 
pertaining to the Real an sich, it would follow that some religious conceptions 
reflected that content more accurately than others. This would entail that some 
religious conceptions were superior to others, and the way would be open for ranking 
religions hierarchically, with pride of place accorded to whichever was deemed to 
possess the most accurate conception of the Real an sich. If this were possible, 
religious pluralism would be on the road to redundancy as the case would be prepared 
for preferring whichever religion was found to have the most accurate conception of 
the Real an sich. 
 Hick’s critics do not let the matter rest here though. Yandell argues that Hick’s 
refusal to allow that any statements apply to the Real which attribute substantial 
properties to it, combined with the uninformative nature of those purely formal 
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concepts which can be applied to it, renders the Real an sich unable to play the 
explanatory role in Hick’s pluralist hypothesis that Hick requires it to perform. After 
all, in elaborating his theory, Hick does attribute substantial properties to the Real an 
sich (such as being the transcendent source and cause of religious experience) that, 
according to his own lights, cannot apply. 
 The refusal to admit that any substantial non-formal properties can be 
correctly ascribed to the Real an sich exposes Hickean pluralism to another serious 
objection. Plantinga poses the problem in the following way: ‘If the Real has no 
positive properties of which we have a grasp, how could we possibly know or have 
grounds for believing that some ways of behaving with respect to it are more 
appropriate than others?’ (Plantinga 2000, 57, and see Yandell 1999, 78–79). Hick 
replies to this criticism by reminding his critics that his is a ‘religious interpretation of 
religion’, and as such it is developed from within the religious standpoint that ‘there is 
a transcendent reality of limitless importance to us’ (Hick 2004, xxv). Applying the 
Principle of Critical Trust to all religious experience (according to which religious 
experience ‘is to be trusted except when we have a reason to distrust it’ (Hick 2004 
xxv–xxvi)), Hick avers that this reality is disclosed through the religious experiences 
available within the various religions of the world. Moreover, the authenticity of such 
religious experiences is judged through its visible effects on human lives, specifically 
in terms of observable moral and spiritual development. And, of course, the notions of 
moral and spiritual development are cashed out in terms of presupposed religious 
appraisals of the importance of the Real within human life. 
As explained above, Hick’s pluralist theory is premised upon a religious 
explanation of the diversity of religions and of the diverse forms of religious 
experience which these religions support. Consequently, Hick’s theory will have 
greatest appeal to those who are already of a religious bent of mind and who are 
seeking to reconcile the particularity of their own faith-tradition with respect for the 
traditions of others. The religiousness of Hick’s theory is surely what has made it so 
appealing to religious practitioners, especially those directly involved in inter-
religious dialogue, but it simultaneously exposes the theory to the criticism of 
philosophers who are trained to regard religious convictions not as premises within 
theories but as standing in need of independent support. 
 
Alternative Forms of Pluralist Theory 
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We have seen that the most well-known and influential pluralist theory—Hickean 
pluralism—is explicitly developed and presented as a religious theory, and we have 
observed that this makes the theory especially vulnerable to criticism. In this section 
we consider the possibility of developing alternative forms of methodological 
pluralism that would be neutral with respect to the choice between a religious and a 
naturalistic interpretation of religion. Consider again what gives rise to the need for a 
theory of religious pluralism. Disagreements about religious belief, both among 
religious people of the same or different affiliations and between religious believers 
and non-believers, are ongoing and often intractable. The scope of such disagreements 
between people who are roughly epistemic peers is what makes a pluralist account of 
religious diversity seem desirable. The core of a viable theory of pluralism in the 
religious domain must be an account of what it means to characterize religious 
statements as true or false, or as capable of being true or false. The details of such an 
account will be what distinguish pluralist theories from exclusivist accounts of 
religious belief (although see D’Costa 1996). According to exclusivist accounts—and 
following one of the core axioms of classical logic—in cases where claims conflict at 
most one of the claims can be true. Truth, on the exclusivist view, is a property that 
can be possessed by at most one claim from a set of conflicting ones. If one holds 
such a view, then a theory of methodological pluralism would be redundant as there 
would be nothing for it to explain (although one may still choose to adopt attitudinal 
pluralism). 
 Furthermore, a theory of methodological pluralism is only required if one 
holds that religious claims can be true or false. If religious claims are thought to be 
non-cognitive, then the questions methodological pluralism seeks to answer do not 
arise. One might, therefore, regard methodological pluralism as occupying the 
conceptual space left between an exclusivist account of religious truth and non-
cognitivist or naturalistic accounts according to which religious claims are either all 
false or are not capable of being either true or false. Clearly, this conceptual space is 
large and hence is able to accommodate a number of different forms of pluralist 
theory. Two basic types of methodological pluralism stand out, these can be 
characterised as reductive pluralisms and non-reductive pluralisms. 
 Reductive pluralisms hold that all major religions are somehow related to, or 
derived from, one thing. Religions are thought to be grounded in a more fundamental 
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reality that transcends them all. John Hick’s pluralist theory is of this type, as it holds 
that all authentic religions are related to the Real. But because, as discussed above, 
Hick further claimed that there is no access to this one fundamental reality except by 
way of the particular religious traditions, his pluralist theory can be more precisely 
described as a non-eliminativist reductionist form of pluralism. Clearly, not all forms 
of reductive pluralism need be non-eliminativist. An example of a form of 
methodological pluralism which is both reductionist and eliminativist has been 
proposed by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. He holds that religions are representations of a 
single ideal divine form of religion and that they all contain distortions, some more 
than others (Nasr 1991). In principle, distortions can all be eliminated leaving only 
one true religion which will be a perfect representation of the ideal. Interestingly, both 
Nasr’s form of pluralism and Hick’s are religious theories, insofar as each identifies in 
religious terms the fundamental reality on which all particular expressions of religion 
are based.  
Non-reductive pluralisms, on the other hand, do not claim that all particular 
religions are related to, or derived from, some single transcendent entity. Religions 
are therefore to be understood without reference to a supposed more fundamental 
reality which transcends them. There are a number of ways in which the details of 
non-reductive pluralism can be spelt out. For instance, according to one version—
known as internalist pluralism—religions might be represented as different and self-
contained conceptual schemata, the claims within which being only evaluable 
internally to those schemata. Given the lack of a common transcendent object to 
which these schemata are somehow all related, convergence between them is deemed 
to be highly unlikely. Hence, eliminativism is avoided.  
 The great advantage of non-reductive and non-eliminativist forms of 
methodological pluralism over reductive forms of pluralism is that they are non-
religious theories which do not depend for their cogency on positing the existence of a 
transcendent entity which is characterised in religious terms. Moreover, they are 
equally unaligned to non-cognitivist or naturalistic perspectives according to which all 
religious claims are false (or at least deemed to be not the sort of claims which could 
be true or false). In fact, the form of non-reductionist methodological pluralism briefly 
alluded to above, namely internalist pluralism, leaves it open whether or not any 
particular claim made within some religious conceptual scheme is true or false. It 
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merely stipulates the methodological framework within which religious claims can be 
investigated and assessed for truth. 
Internalist pluralism is a form of methodological pluralism that is concerned 
with the nature of truth-claims within different religious conceptual schemata (see 
Harrison 2006, 2008 and 2011). It is based on Hilary Putnam’s theory of internal 
realism, and in particular on his characterisation of the relationship between 
conceptual schemata, ontology, justification and truth (see, especially, Putnam 1981). 
Essentially, according to internalist pluralism, all substantial religious claims are 
made within some conceptual scheme or another and can only be properly understood 
and assessed within the context of the appropriate conceptual scheme. Hence, all such 
claims will be found to be true or false only within the relevant conceptual scheme. 
Consider, for example, the question ‘did the Buddha attained nirvana?’. Internalist 
pluralism holds that this question can only be sensibly raised within a Buddhist 
conceptual scheme. If we want to know what ‘nirvana’ refers to we must look to the 
conceptual scheme within which nirvana has a place. It would make no sense to ask 
whether the Buddha attained nirvana within the framework of a conceptual scheme, 
such as a Christian one, within which the concept of nirvana did not occur. An 
internalist pluralist would hold that the meaning of the term ‘nirvana’ is only 
accessible within the appropriate conceptual scheme, thus to make judgements about 
the truth or falsity of claims which include this concept is only possible within that 
conceptual scheme. Let us say that within a Buddhist conceptual scheme it turned out 
to be true that the Buddha attained nirvana, what would that imply about the truth or 
falsity of the claim ‘the Buddha attained nirvana’ within the framework of a Christian 
conceptual scheme? The internalist pluralist would claim that it implies nothing. From 
the truth of a claim within one conceptual scheme one cannot ‘read off’ its truth 
within any other scheme. Indeed, this claim may be neither true nor false within a 
Christian conceptual scheme because nirvana is not recognised as a possible object 
within a Christian ontology (see Harrison 2008). 
 There are, of course, problems which internalist pluralism must address, many 
concerning the cogency of internal realism, these cannot be dealt with here (but see 
Harrison 2008). The theory has been briefly introduced here merely to illustrate the 
potential of non-reductive and non-eliminativist forms of methodological pluralism to 
remain genuinely neutral with respect to different religious conceptions, and between 
religious and naturalistic interpretations of religion, and thereby to provide a 
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framework within which claims can be investigated for truth without determining in 
advance which of them, if any, are thought to be true. The ability of non-reductive 
non-eliminativist forms of methodological pluralism to deliver such a framework 
recommends them as potentially capable of supporting the practice of genuinely 
tradition-neutral philosophy of religion. However, if philosophy of religion is to be 
developed further in this direction it must face additional complexities arising from 
engagement with the various philosophical systems that have developed within and 
alongside non-western religious traditions, some of which, as we shall now see, 
already include pluralist theories at their core. 
 
Non-Western Pluralisms 
 
Discussions of religious pluralism within the philosophy of religion often overlook 
pluralist theories that have been developed within non-western religious philosophies. 
John Hick noted the similarity of his pluralist theory to the much early theory 
elaborated by the architect of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, Śaṇkara (788–820? CE). 
Indeed, the similarity between these theories in both their metaphysics and their 
epistemology is so striking that one might mount a modern philosophical defence of 
Śaṇkara’s theory by deploying Hick’s arguments. Conversely, the arguments targeted 
against Hick’s account of the Real an sich apply with equal force to Śaṇkara’s 
account of Nirguṇa Brahman (that is, Brahman without qualities). This is especially 
problematic given Hick’s claim to have proposed a pluralist theory that does not 
favour any one religious tradition. The similarities between Hick’s theory and 
Śaṇkara’s also undermine Hick’s repeated assertion that he is not advocating his 
pluralist theory as an alternative religious tradition. Despite the seriousness of these 
problems, the issues they raise have not received adequate attention within the 
literature. 
 A further striking gap in the literature on pluralism within philosophy of 
religion concerns the pluralist theory that lies at the heart of Jain philosophy. In 
response to persistent disagreement about religious and philosophical claims on the 
Indian subcontinent in the early centuries of the Common Era, Jain logicians devised 
a sophisticated theory to explain why it was the case that equally rational people 
supported apparently conflicting views. The explanation that they proposed to account 
 18 
for this troubling fact was premised upon their claim that reality is many-sided 
(anekānta) and that people adopt different perspectives (nayas) which allow them to 
understand selective aspects of reality. They held that adopting a perspective 
inevitably precludes one from attaining a comprehensive understanding of anything 
because any one perspective is only capable of giving partial knowledge of what is the 
case. This conviction led Jains to claim that any single assertion about a thing will be 
incapable of expressing the whole nature of that thing. They concluded from this that 
our assertions cannot be unconditionally true, but only true in a certain respect. 
 In short, the Jains proposed a pluralist theory according to which one could 
assert such claims as ‘X has property y’ and ‘X does not have property y’ without 
contradicting oneself. We routinely experience instances of objects both possessing 
and not possessing a particular property and, as in such cases we do not hold that our 
experience is contradictory, we should not, they argued, hold that the assertions we 
form on the basis of our experience are contradictory. The stock example they used to 
illustrate this idea was a cloth with two colours, blue and grey. What colour is such a 
cloth? One answer (a Buddhist one) would be that the cloth has no colour at all and 
only the individual threads have colour—some being blue and others being grey. 
Another answer would be that the cloth has a single new colour which is the product 
of a mixture of the colours of its parts. Both of these views are extremes, according to 
the Jains, and both, they held, are contrary to common sense. The Jain position is that 
the cloth is both blue and not blue, and both grey and not grey. As we have seen, they 
claim that properties such as ‘blue’ and ‘not blue’ are not properly regarded as 
contradictory because we regularly encounter them in our experience and our 
experience is not contradictory. Observations such as this led them to propose a 
method for the analysis of assertions which, they held, was capable of explaining how 
we can say, for example, both that ‘the cloth is blue’ and that ‘the cloth is not blue’ 
without actually contradicting ourselves—despite the surface grammar of these 
utterances. 
Jain logicians rejected the principle—which was widely accepted in their own 
day, as it is in ours—that assertion and denial are mutually exclusive alternatives. 
They rejected this principle on the grounds that assertions have, what they called, 
‘hidden parameters’ that are not made explicit in our ordinary ways of using language. 
In their view, assertion does not rule out denial because of the hidden parameters 
governing the scope of particular assertions and denials. With respect to one set of 
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parameters, one might be able correctly to assert ‘X has property y’, while, with 
respect to another set, one might be able correctly to assert ‘X does not have property 
y’. They attempt to explain this further by means of their theory of seven modes 
(saptabhaṇgī), according to which any statement can be asserted in seven possible 
ways (see Ganeri 2001 and, for an introductory account, Harrison 2012, 42–47). 
With their theory of seven modes and their account of the limited nature of 
perspectives, the Jains proposed a novel framework within which to think about the 
rival commitments of various religious and philosophical schools. Despite the 
sophistication of this account there has been little discussion of it within the 
philosophy of religion. The current neglect of the Jain form of pluralism is perhaps 
symptomatic of how much further philosophy of religion needs to go in order to 
become a discipline in which the ideas and perspectives of all (or all major) religious 
traditions are given due weight. It also points to the deeper issues concerning 
philosophical methodology that lurk not far beneath apparently straightforward 
discussions of religious pluralism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One urgent task now facing philosophers of religion is to continue the process, 
already well underway, of integrating the philosophical analysis of the claims of non-
western religious traditions into a discipline whose curriculum has until fairly recently 
been dominated by a focus on western religious ideas. It seems likely that this process 
would be facilitated by attention to, and further development of, different forms of 
methodological pluralism, especially non-reductive and non-eliminativist versions. 
While the contribution that John Hick’s form of pluralist theory has made to 
philosophy of religion should not be underestimated, it is time to take the discussion 
and critical scrutiny of methodological pluralism beyond the framework for debate 
established by Hick. 
 While much philosophy of religion now routinely takes into account a variety 
of religious perspectives, to date there has been insufficient attention devoted to 
developing a methodology that could underwrite this new approach. Remedying this 
may well be the most urgent conceptual issue currently facing the subject. Tackling 
this issue requires that philosophers of religion take into account that different 
 20 
religious traditions have been associated with a number of diverse philosophical 
traditions (consider the philosophical traditions of India, for example). Despite the 
fact that philosophers of religion are increasingly expected to be sensitive to this 
higher-level philosophical diversity, so far there has been little acknowledgement of 
the depth of the problems that need to be faced once we take seriously the idea that 
we might have diversity all the way down, even down to our philosophical traditions 
and the logical systems which underlie them (see Priest 2006). This suggests that 
theories of religious pluralism need to develop alongside theories of more general 
philosophical, and logical, pluralism if they are to be genuinely responsive to diversity 
on the different levels at which it is found in the various religious and philosophical 
traditions of the world. 
 As I have argued above, once the diversity of the world’s religious traditions 
becomes more fully integrated into philosophy of religion, the deeper issues raised by 
philosophical diversity will also have to be dealt with. A pluralist theory that is 
adequate to the task will need to be capable of making sense of the practice of 
philosophy of religion when it cuts across religious and philosophical traditions. A 
Hickean approach might be adopted—one which seeks to relate all the philosophical 
traditions to a single ‘transcendental’ one (the strategy of reduction without 
elimination). Or an alternative may be sought—such as a form of internalist 
pluralism—which resists both reduction to one philosophical or religious system and 
the elimination of diversity. 
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